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1. Introduction 
It seems to be a common assumption that conversational implicatures arise only 
when one of the so-called conversational maxims is violated. Bach (2006), for 
example, explicitly states that “implicatures (and implicitures) arise only when one 
or another maxim is flouted or violated”. This is not to say, of course, that, when-
ever there is an implicature, a maxim is violated at the level of what the speaker 
overall conveys. Such a view would be bizarre. Rather, the thesis is that implica-
tures arise only if a maxim is violated at the level of what is said. (I will say more 
about the notion of observing a maxim at a given level below.) The basic idea 
behind this thesis is that, unless a maxim is violated at the level of what is said, 
nothing can trigger the search for an implicature. Thus, non-violating implicatures 
wouldn’t be calculable. As Bach puts it immediately after the just quoted passage, 
“when no maxim is flouted or violated, one can infer that the speaker means what 
he says. That is, there is nothing to trigger the sort of inference that Grice 
sketches out for when there is an apparent breach of a maxim.” 
As far as I can see, Bach is the only one to explicitly endorse the above posi-
tion. Many other authors, however, seem implicitly committed to it. DeRose 
(2009:122), for example, argues as follows against the presence of an alleged 
implicature in a given scenario: “[T]he speaker asserts what would be an ex-
tremely relevant thought. So, how can relevance concerns securely lead the lis-
tener to the conclusion that what the speaker intends to convey is not that ex-
tremely relevant thought he has asserted, but rather some other proposition?” 
The basic idea here seems to be that, unless the maxim of Relation is violated at 
the level of what is said (or, in DeRose’s terminology, at the level of what is as-
serted), this maxim at least cannot lead the listener to start fishing around for 
possible implicatures. In a similar context, Blome-Tillmann (2013b:4303) argues 
that assuming an implicature in a given case is implausible because “there are 
simply no convincing reasons to accept the view that [the utterance in question] 
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is, when taken literally, overly informative or uninformative, evidentially un-
founded, conversationally irrelevant or overly imprecise, prolix or convoluted.” 
Again, this suggests that a violation of the maxims at the level of what is said (the 
“literal” level) is required for the presence of an implicature.1 
Whatever the considered views of the just quoted authors turn out to be in the 
end, the thesis that implicatures require maxim violations at the level of what is 
said undoubtedly is attractive, and one may easily get in the mood of writing in its 
spirit. Moreover, as will become apparent below, it is not at all trivial to coherently 
deny this thesis. The goal of this paper is to show that, even so, the thesis cannot 
be taken for granted and that there is a genuine alternative to it. Along the way, I 
hope to clarify various aspects of the idea that implicatures are calculable. I think 
that these clarifications help to elucidate certain debates in philosophy (particu-
larly, the one DeRose and Blome-Tillmann engage in in the just quoted pas-
sages), but I will not spell out these consequences here. 
The plan for this paper is as follows: As a first step (section 2), I will outline an 
intuitively very plausible distinction drawn in Grice (1989) and Levinson’s (1983) 
classic introductions to implicatures; namely, the distinction between what I will 
call observation and exploitation implicatures. I will then argue (sections 3 – 5) 
that, on its most plausible interpretation, this distinction is a distinction between, 
on the one hand, implicatures that don’t involve the violation of a maxim at the 
level of what is said and, on the other hand, implicatures that do involve the vio-
lation of a maxim at the level of what is said. I will thus conclude that Grice and 
Levinson held that many implicatures—namely, all observation implicatures—
arise even though no maxim is violated at the level of what is said. Furthermore, 
I will have presented one prima facie coherent way of spelling out the idea of non-
violating implicatures. Finally (section 6), I will defend these implicatures against 
the just indicated worry that they aren’t calculable because, unless a maxim is 
violated at the level of what is said, nothing can trigger the search for an implica-
ture. Once this worry is out of the way, there is at least no obvious reason any-
more to be suspicious of observation implicatures.  
                                            
1 See also Bianchi (2013:112). 
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2. Observation and exploitation implicatures 
Conversational implicatures are standardly considered calculable. For Grice, this 
is even a defining characteristic of conversational implicatures (by means of 
which they are set apart from conventional implicatures).2 Correspondingly, I will 
take it for granted in this paper that conversational implicatures are calculable, at 
least in central cases of successful communication. What does it mean to say 
that a given implicature is calculable? Roughly, it means the implicature can be 
derived from the assumption that the speaker is being cooperative (in a yet to be 
specified sense) by making the corresponding utterance. The notion of coopera-
tiveness here can be spelled out in various ways.3 I will follow Grice (1989:26f) in 
assuming, roughly, that a speaker is being cooperative (in the relevant sense) 
just if she observes the following (conversational) maxims: 
Quality1: Do not say what you believe to be false. 
Quality2: Do not say that for which you lack evidence. 
Quantity1: Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the 
current purpose of the exchange). 
Quantity2: Do not make your contribution more informative than is re-
quired. 
Relation: Be relevant. 
Manner: Be perspicuous. 
In what sense are implicatures supposed to be derivable from the assumption 
that a speaker is being cooperative, that is, observes the above maxims? 
According to Levinson, these “inferences come about in at least two distinct 
ways” (1983:104). On the one hand, implicatures may “arise directly from the 
assumption that the speaker is observing the maxims.” (1983:105) On the other 
hand, implicatures may “come about by overtly and blatantly not following some 
maxim, in order to exploit it for communicative purposes.” (1983:109) (See below 
for examples.) Levinson’s distinction seems based on a corresponding distinction 
                                            
2 See e.g. Grice (1989:31). 
3 See Blome-Tillmann (2013a:176) for a brief discussion of options. 
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drawn by Grice. On the one hand, Grice says, there are cases of implicatures “in 
which no maxim is violated, or at least in which it is not clear that any maxim is 
violated” (1989:32). On the other hand, he says, there are cases of implicatures 
in which, “though some maxim is violated at the level of what is said, the hearer 
is entitled to assume that that maxim, or at least the overall Cooperative Principle, 
is observed at the level of what is implicated.” These latter cases, Grice holds, 
“involve exploitation, that is, a procedure by which a maxim is flouted” (1989:32f). 
I will refer to the first kind of implicatures as observation implicatures, and to the 
second as exploitation implicatures. 
To get an initial grasp on the distinction between observation and exploitation 
implicatures, it is useful to consider specific examples of each kind of implicature. 
The following case provides an example of an observation implicature based on 
the maxim of Relation:4 Someone responds to the question of where to get petrol 
by saying, “There is a garage around the corner.” She thereby implicates that the 
garage (most likely) sells petrol. This implicature is supposed to be observational 
very roughly for the following reason: The implicature can be calculated as fol-
lows: The hearer assumes that the speaker is observing the maxims. She real-
izes, however, that the speaker would not be observing the maxims—in particu-
lar, Relation—if she did not think the garage (most likely) sells petrol. Thus, the 
speaker believes and implicates that the garage sells petrol. This calculation is 
based on the assumption that the speaker is observing the maxims. Hence, the 
implicature is observational. (The reasoning described in this paragraph will be 
further clarified below.) 
The following case provides an example of an exploitation implicature also 
based on the maxim of Relation:5 Someone responds to the question of what to 
do about John’s absence by saying, “John will come or he won’t.” She thereby 
implicates that nothing can be done about John’s absence. This implicature is 
                                            
4 See Grice (1989:32). 
5 See Levinson (1983:111). To be precise, Levinson considers the above implicature as based 
on Quantity1. I think, however, that it can just as well be treated in terms of Relation. The subse-
quent discussion should make this clear. 
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supposed to be exploitational very roughly for the following reason: The implica-
ture can be calculated as follows: The hearer realizes that what the speaker says 
is a mere logical truth and, thus, irrelevant for the purposes at hand. Hence, what 
the speaker says “overtly and blatantly” fails to comply with the maxims, in par-
ticular, Relation. Consequently, the hearer concludes, the speaker must have 
meant to convey something other than what she said; and the most plausible 
candidate here is that nothing can be done about John’s absence. So this is what 
the speaker implicates. This calculation is based on the observation that the 
speaker “overtly and blatantly” fails to follow the maxims. Thus, the implicature is 
exploitational. (Again, the reasoning described will be further clarified below.) 
Even given these examples, many details concerning the distinction between 
observation and exploitation implicatures remain obscure. In what follows, I will 
try to point out these obscurities and remove them as far as possible in order to 
arrive at a definition of observation and exploitation implicatures that plausibly 
captures Grice and Levinson’s thoughts. The basic upshot will be that observa-
tion implicatures should be defined as implicatures involving no maxim violation 
at the level of what is said.6 Throughout the discussion, I will focus on the two 
example cases just described. What I say, however, should straightforwardly ap-
ply to other cases as well. Some further examples will be discussed by the end 
of the paper. 
Before we go on, a clarificatory remark might be in order. It may be tempting 
to identify the distinction between observation and exploitation implicatures with 
another distinction sometimes drawn in the literature on implicatures; namely, the 
                                            
6 Levinson says of implicatures that they “come about” or “arise” because the maxims are 
being observed or violated. This may be a controversial way to put it. Arguably, it is the audience’s 
inference to the implicature that comes about because the maxims are being observed or violated. 
The implicature itself may have been there all along (for example, because of certain communi-
cative intentions on the part of the speaker). Correspondingly, I will distinguish observation from 
exploitation implicatures based on whether they involve the observation or violation of a maxim 
(following Grice). This leaves open whether the observations and violations involved in a given 
case of implicature give rise to the implicature itself or only the audience’s inference to it. 
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distinction between what we may call additive and substitutional implicatures (fol-
lowing (Meibauer, 2009:374)).7 Additive implicatures are implicatures where the 
speaker means what is said and something else in addition. Thus, the speaker in 
the petrol case means that there is a garage around the corner and that it sells 
petrol. Substitutional implicatures, on the other hand, are implicatures where the 
speaker doesn’t mean what is said, but something else instead.8 Thus, in the 
case of John’s absence, the speaker plausibly does not mean the logical truth 
she expresses, but merely the implicature that nothing can be done about John’s 
absence. (I am assuming here that meaning that p entails intending to make one’s 
audience believe that p.) This distinction is interestingly related to the distinction 
between observation and exploitation implicatures, but the categories do not co-
incide: While I do think that all observation implicatures are additive, it is not the 
case that all exploitation implicatures are substitutional. To see this, consider 
Grice’s (1989:33) letter of recommendation case, where an advisor writes about 
her philosophy student, “She has a nice handwriting,” thus implicating that the 
student is no good at philosophy. This case is standardly assumed to involve an 
exploitation implicature. Still, the implicature may be additive because the advisor 
may well mean that the student in fact has a nice handwriting and that there is 
nothing more commendable to be said about her (see below for some further 
discussion of this example).9 
                                            
7 Bianchi (2013:120) suggests such an interpretation. 
8 Note that, for Grice, such implicatures cannot exist because he holds that saying something 
entails meaning it. On his account, substitutional implicatures would be implicatures where the 
speaker is only “making as if to say.” See e.g. Grice (1989:30). See Bach (1994:Sec. 5) for to my 
mind compelling reasons to deny that saying entails meaning. 
9 Note that the distinction between indirect speech act contents and nonliteral speech act con-
tents drawn in Bach and Harnish (1979:Ch. 4) coincides neither with the distinction between ad-
ditive and substitutional implicatures nor with the distinction between observation and exploitation 
implicatures. The handwriting case shows that some indirect speech act contents are exploitation 
implicatures. The following case (discussed in Bach and Harnish (1979:70)) shows that some 
indirect speech act contents are substitutional implicatures: A mother says sarcastically to the 
son, “I’m sure the cat likes having its tail pulled.” This utterance involves a nonliteral speech act 
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3. Observing the maxims at the level of what is said or conveyed 
How should we understand the distinction between observation and exploitation 
implicatures? Here is a first obscurity besetting its initial characterization. Con-
sider the implicature in the case about John’s absence. Given that the case is 
supposed to involve an exploitation implicature, Levinson, for example, has to 
maintain that the speaker is “overtly and blatantly not following some maxim.” 
However, there is at least a sense in which the speaker does not fail to observe 
any maxim at all. For, in saying, “John will come or he won’t,” the speaker con-
veys that nothing can be done about John’s absence. And this latter claim is per-
fectly relevant, the speaker presumably believes it, etc. 
The proper response to this worry should be relatively obvious and has been 
indicated already: We must distinguish between observing the maxims at the 
level of what is said and observing the maxims at the level of what is conveyed. 
To sustain this response, however, the idea of observing the maxims at different 
levels must be clarified. What does it mean to observe the maxims at a given 
level? To begin with, note that the maxims as quoted from Grice above seem 
somewhat mixed: While some maxims refer to what is said (Quality1, Quality2), 
some maxims refer to what is “contributed” (Quantity1, Quantity2) and some max-
ims are neutral in this regard (Relation, Manner). We arrive at a more coherent 
picture if we state all maxims neutrally: 
Quality1: Be sincere. 
Quality2: Be justified. 
Quantity1: Be as informative as is required (for the current purpose of the 
exchange). 
Quantity2: Don’t be more informative than is required. 
Relation: Be relevant. 
                                            
(with the content that the cat doesn’t like having its tail pulled) and an indirect speech act (with 
the content that the son should stop what he’s doing). Still, it only involves substitutional implica-
tures because what is said is not meant. 
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Manner: Be perspicuous.10 
Once the maxims are stated in this way, we can straightforwardly define what 
it means to observe individual maxims at a given level. Consider the maxim of 
Relation. This maxim says that you should be relevant. To observe this maxim at 
the level of what is said (or conveyed respectively) is to say (convey) something 
relevant. Similarly, to observe the quality maxims at the level of what is said (con-
veyed) is to say (convey) what one believes and is in a position to justify. And to 
observe the quantity maxims at the level of what is said (conveyed) is to say 
(convey) something informative, but not too informative. 
Manner is special. For it is not clear how to make sense of the idea that one 
should be perspicuous at the level of what is said as opposed to the level of what 
is conveyed. Rather, it seems that one can be perspicuous only at the sentence 
level. In a similar vein, Grice (1989:27) says of Manner that it should be seen “as 
relating not (like the previous categories) to what is said but, rather, to how what 
is said is to be said”. For example, the submaxim of Manner, “Avoid ambigu-
ity,” (Grice, 1989:27) clearly relates neither to what is said nor to what is conveyed 
but only to the sentence used. Consequently, I will assume in what follows that 
one cannot distinguish between observing Manner at the level of what is said and 
observing Manner at the level of what is conveyed. Manner can only be observed 
simpliciter. 
Given this account of what it means to observe individual maxims at different 
levels, we can define what it means for a speaker to observe the maxims (as a 
whole) at a given level: A speaker observes the maxims at the level of what is 
said (conveyed) just if she observes each individual maxim except for Manner at 
the level of what is said (conveyed) and she observes Manner. 
                                            
10 Bach (2015:56f) also notes the mixed nature of the maxims as presented by Grice. Instead 
of amending them by stating them neutrally, however, he opts for a construal where all maxims 
refer to the “conversational contribution”. The neutral interpretation seems more straightforward 
at least insofar as we want to allow that the maxims can be observed not only at the level of what 
is contributed but also at the level of what is said. 
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To respond to the worry above, we can now construe exploitation implicatures 
as implicatures where the speaker fails to observe the maxims at the level of what 
is said. The case of John’s absence thereby comes out as involving an exploita-
tion implicature because, in saying something irrelevant, the speaker fails to ob-
serve Relation at the level of what is said. 
4. Observing the maxim of Relation 
So much for the first unclarity. Here is a second unclarity. Consider observation 
implicatures. Grice says of observation implicatures that they occur in cases in 
which there is “no maxim that is violated, or at least in which it is not clear that 
any maxim is violated.” Levinson says that, in these cases, implicatures “arise 
directly from the assumption that the speaker is observing the maxims.”11 Obvi-
ously, we must understand these claims as claims about observing or violating 
the maxims at the level of what is said, for we have seen that, even in the case 
of exploitation implicatures, no maxim is violated at the level of what is conveyed. 
But given that, why should the petrol case above turn out to involve an observa-
tion implicature? What the speaker says in this case is that there is a garage 
around the corner. The question on the table is where to get petrol. Now, of 
course, there are garages that don’t sell petrol, so what the speaker says at least 
does not entail an answer to the question on the table. In a sense, then, what the 
speaker says is not relevant. Hence, in a sense, the speaker does violate Relation 
at the level of what is said, and, it may seem, the relevant implicature is exploita-
tional rather than observational, contrary to what Grice and Levinson say. How 
should we deal with this problem? 
One potential response would be the following: We could grant that the 
speaker in the petrol case violates Relation at the level of what is said. In order 
to maintain the idea that, nevertheless, the case features an observation implica-
ture, we could further admit that observation implicatures involve the violation of 
                                            
11 Note here that I will understand “observing a maxim” in a non-intentional way. Thus, some-
one observes e.g. Relation if she says something relevant, whether or not she intends to say 
something relevant. Correspondingly, “observing a maxim” and “not violating a maxim” are inter-
changeable. 
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a maxim at the level of what is said. In order to maintain the distinction between 
observation and exploitation implicatures, we could then define exploitation im-
plicatures as implicatures where the speaker not only violates, but overtly and 
blatantly violates or flouts a maxim at the level of what is said. We would thus 
arrive at the position I am calling into question in this paper, according to which 
all implicatures involve the violation of a maxim. 
Note that this interpretation of the distinction between observation and exploi-
tation implicatures is not in direct tension with the passages quoted from Grice 
and Levinson above. Neither Grice nor Levinson directly says that, in the case of 
observation implicatures, no maxim is violated at the level of what is said. Grice 
adds the disjunct “or at least in which it is not clear that any maxim is violated,” 
which opens up a lot of room for interpretation. Levinson only says that these 
implicatures “arise directly from the assumption that the speaker is observing the 
maxims.” And one may argue that even if an implicature arises from this assump-
tion, this does not entail that the assumption is correct. Still, the above interpre-
tation is problematic in various ways. 
First, it is in direct tension with what Grice says on other occasions. For exam-
ple, he distinguishes exploitation from observation implicatures on the grounds 
that they are “achieved by real, as distinct from apparent” (1989:35) violations of 
a maxim. Thus, according to Grice, observation implicatures only involve appar-
ent maxim violations.12 Second, and more importantly, it is unclear why the 
speaker in the petrol case should not be said to overtly and blatantly violate or 
flout Relation. After all, it does seem fairly obvious that what she says does not 
entail an answer to the question at hand. Unless this latter challenge is met, the 
distinction between observation and exploitation implicatures collapses if defined 
                                            
12 Note that the violation of a maxim in the case of observation implicatures cannot be apparent 
in the sense that, while a violation occurs at the level of what is said, no violation occurs at the 
level of what is conveyed. For, as argued above, this would not distinguish observation from ex-
ploitation implicatures. 
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along the above lines.13 It is possible, of course, that Grice and Levinson simply 
failed to pick out a sensible distinction, but a more charitable interpretation is 
available as I will subsequently show. 
I will start out with the definitions already used, according to which observation 
implicatures are implicatures where the speaker observes the maxims at the level 
of what is said, while exploitation implicatures are implicatures where the speaker 
fails to observe the maxims at the level of what is said. This prompts the worry 
again that, contrary to Grice and Levinson, the petrol case turns out to involve an 
exploitation implicature. In order to respond to this worry, I will proceed as follows: 
I will first clarify the notion of relevance. Second, I will restate Relation in terms of 
this clarified notion. Finally, I will show that, given this clarified version of Relation, 
the speaker in the petrol case turns out to be observing Relation at the level of 
what is said. 
So, what is relevance? Providing a general, informative definition of relevance 
goes beyond the scope of this paper. Correspondingly, I will, first, restrict my view 
to simple conversations such as the one in the petrol case, where a specific ques-
tion is on the table, and people contribute to the conversation by making claims 
                                            
13 It might be tempting to respond that, while in the case of John’s absence we would straight-
forwardly acknowledge that what is said is irrelevant, we would intuitively say that what is said in 
the petrol case is relevant. Thus, in this sense, the maxim violation is overt and blatant in the 
former but not the latter case. Such a response, however, seems self-undermining. If it is true that 
we would intuitively say that what is said in the petrol case is relevant (as I think we would), then 
this speaks strongly for the assumption that what is said in this case indeed is relevant and, thus, 
that there is no maxim violation after all. So, the relevant implicature would come out as neither 
observational nor exploitational on the present understanding of these terms. Another potential 
response might be that, other than in the petrol case, the irrelevance in the case of John’s ab-
sence psychologically stands out in some way when interpreting the utterance in question. This, 
again, may be taken to underwrite the idea that the violation of the maxims is overt and blatant 
only in the case of John’s absence. Such a response is implausible because in many cases of 
exploitation implicatures, maxim violations do not stand out at all. For example, when I say, “Can 
you pass me the salt?” I will exploitationally implicate that you should pass me the salt. The cal-
culation of this implicature, however, may go entirely unnoticed. (This seems true in general for 
so-called “standardized” or “generalized” implicatures.) 
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rather than asking questions, issuing commands, etc. Second, I will only try to 
clarify the logical form of the notion of relevance and suggest a tentative way of 
filling out that form. This will leave many questions open, but for our purposes, 
we will make progress enough. 
Clearly, relevance is at least a two-place relation. The relevance of a given 
claim will always be relative to the question on the table. Thus, we preliminarily 
arrive at the following logical form: 
Claim P is relevant for question Q. 
This, however, is not enough, for whether a given claim is relevant very often 
depends on our background beliefs. If I, for example, believe that all garages sell 
petrol, the claim that there is a garage around the corner will be relevant for me 
regarding the question of where to get petrol. For somebody else who, for what-
ever reason, believes that garages never sell petrol, the same claim will be irrel-
evant regarding the same question. Therefore, it seems that we need a further 
argument place along the following lines: 
Claim P is relevant for question Q relative to a set of beliefs B. 
Even further argument places may be required, but since they will be immaterial 
to the project at hand, I will stick to the logical form above. 
Given this logical form, we can provide the following rough and ready definition 
of what it means for a claim to be relevant: 
Claim P is relevant for question Q relative to a set of beliefs B just if there 
is a possible answer to Q such that P together with B makes the truth 
of that answer more likely than B alone. 
Given this definition, we can use the three-place relation of relevance to clarify 
what it means to observe Relation at the level of what is said. Here is my proposal: 
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A speaker S making an utterance u in a conversational context C ob-
serves Relation at the level of what is said just if what S says by utter-
ing u is relevant for the question on the table in C relative to the mutual 
beliefs of S and her audience in C.14 
With this definition at hand, we can return to the question of why the speaker 
in the petrol case doesn’t violate Relation at the level of what is said. The answer 
should now be clear: The speaker and her audience presumably share the belief 
that garages generally sell petrol. If we add to this belief the claim that there is a 
garage around the corner, it becomes more likely that one can get petrol around 
the corner. The latter claim is an answer to the question of where to get petrol. 
Hence, the speaker’s claim is relevant relative to the beliefs she shares with her 
audience as regards the question on the table. As a result, she observes Relation 
at the level of what is said according to the just stated definition. 
To be clear, the present definitions also yield the right result for the case of 
John’s absence. The question on the table in this case is what to do about John’s 
absence. Possible answers to this question are that one should call him, that one 
should call his parents, that one should just ignore it, etc. Clearly, none of these 
answers becomes more likely to be true if we add the logical truth that John will 
or will not come to the mutual beliefs of the speaker and her audience in this case. 
Correspondingly, the speaker turns out to be violating Relation at the level of what 
is said, just as she should.  
Before we go on, note that the present interpretation of Relation presumably 
constrains the interpretation of other maxims, in particular, the quantity maxims. 
Quantity1, for example, says that one should be as informative as is required. 
This seems at least roughly equivalent to saying that one should provide enough 
                                            
14 On the present definition, responses like “I don’t know” or “Ask Sally” to a given question 
invariably turn out to violate Relation at the level of what is said. I don’t think this result is prob-
lematic. Such responses plausibly amount to admitting that one doesn’t have anything relevant 
to say and, hence, is opting out of the maxims (or, at least, the particular obligation to say some-
thing relevant to the specific question one is being asked). See Dorst (2014) for a related proposal. 
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relevant information. Hence, given that relevance operates only against the back-
drop of a set of beliefs, the same should go for informativeness. The details, 
though, do not promise further insights into the issues addressed in this paper, 
so I will leave them for another occasion. 
5. Observing one maxim at the cost of another 
So far, then, we can accept the following definitions: 
(DefE) Exploitation implicatures are implicatures where the speaker fails 
to observe the maxims at the level of what is said. 
(DefO) Observation implicatures are implicatures where the speaker ob-
serves the maxims at the level of what is said. 
But the following case seems problematic: We want to send a letter to Frankie, 
and you respond to the question of where he lives by saying, “Somewhere in the 
south of France.” Presumably, you will thereby implicate that you don’t know 
where exactly Frankie lives.15 Does this case involve an observation or an exploi-
tation implicature? We may want to say that it involves an exploitation implicature, 
for you clearly say less than would be required and thus violate the quantity max-
ims at the level of what is said. Such a case, however, is standardly considered 
to involve an observation implicature.16 How do we get this verdict? 
There are at least two ways to go. I don’t know which of these ways is ultimately 
preferable, so I will just state them in turn. Here is the first: We modify our above 
definitions of observation and exploitation implicatures along the following lines: 
(DefE*) Exploitation implicatures are implicatures where the speaker, S, 
fails to observe the maxims at the level of what is said, and there is a 
proposition p available to S such that, if S had said that p, she would 
                                            
15 See Grice (1989:32f) for a similar case. 
16 See Levinson (1983:107). Grice (1989:32) assumes that implicatures of the above type be-
long to a third category, the category of implicatures involving “clashes” between maxims. I side 
with Levinson in distinguishing only two kinds of implicatures. See below. 
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have been closer to observing the maxims at the level of what is said 
than she actually is.17 
(DefO*) Observation implicatures are implicatures where either the 
speaker, S, observes the maxims at the level of what is said, or there 
is no proposition p available to S such that, if S had said that p, she 
would have been closer to observing the maxims at the level of what 
is said than she actually is.18 
Some clarificatory remarks: Why the restriction to available propositions in 
both definitions? The basic idea behind this restriction is just that we wouldn’t 
want to ascribe an exploitation implicature just because a speaker failed to say 
what didn’t even come to her mind. Further details are unnecessary for the pur-
pose of this paper.19 
What does it mean to be closer to observing the maxims? Take Quality2. This 
maxim says you should be justified. I take it that justification comes in degrees 
and that, to be justified simpliciter, one’s degree of justification must lie above a 
certain threshold. Correspondingly, one is closer to observing Quality2 the closer 
one’s degree of justification is to this threshold. The closest one can get to ob-
serving Quality2 is just to observe that maxim and, hence, to be justified sim-
pliciter. Similar things can be said about the other maxims. 
One thing is very important to note here. To be justified simpliciter does not 
mean to be maximally justified. One can be justified even if one’s justification 
could be better. Thus, in order to observe Quality2, one needs to be justified, but 
                                            
17 This definition captures at least one sense in which speakers in the case of exploitation 
implicatures not only fail to observe the maxims but “flout” them. 
18 One may worry about the disjunctive nature of this definition (and thus prefer the above-
indicated three-partite classification of implicatures by Grice). To respond, note that (DefO*) is 
unified in the following sense: It seems to capture at least roughly the previously mentioned in-
tentional notion of observing a maxim, where one observes the maxims just in case one is doing 
one’s best to satisfy all maxims. Even if one fulfills only the second disjunct of (DefO*), one can 
still be said to be observing the maxims in this sense. 
19 See Tversky and Kahneman (1973) for a notion of availability that seems to serve my pur-
poses. 
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not maximally justified. Similarly, to observe Relation, one needs to be relevant 
but not as relevant as possible, to observe Manner, one needs to be perspicuous 
but not perspicuous to the highest degree, etc. Unless we keep this in mind, there 
is at least the threat that every implicature will turn out to be exploitational on the 
present definitions: Speakers would hardly if ever observe the maxims at the level 
of what is said because, for example, their justification for the relevant claim could 
almost always be better. Thus, the first conjunct of (DefE*) would almost always 
be satisfied. The second conjunct would also be satisfied for the following reason: 
Instead of implicating something, one could always directly say it. Thereby, one 
would presumably score higher on the Manner scale and, thus, be closer to ob-
serving the maxims at the level of what is said.20 These consequences do not 
follow once we appreciate that, to observe a maxim, one need not satisfy that 
maxim to the highest degree. Given that, people can observe Quality2 even if 
their justification could be better. Moreover, saying something directly instead of 
implicating it need not get one closer to observing the maxims at the level of what 
is said (even granted that it makes one score higher with regard to some maxims). 
For one may have observed the maxims at the level of what is said already in the 
first place and, thus, be already as close as one can get to observing the maxims 
at that level. 
Take the petrol case. Of course, the speaker in this case could have uttered, 
“There is a garage around the corner which sells petrol.” This utterance would 
arguably have been more perspicuous than the original utterance, “There is a 
garage around the corner.” But since, with the second utterance, the speaker 
already observed the maxims at the level of what is said (for example, she already 
passed the threshold for perspicuity21), the first utterance cannot get her closer 
to observing the maxims. This contrasts with the case of John’s absence. As we 
                                            
20 Wilson (2006:1727) expresses a similar worry when she writes that “whatever implicature is 
derived, the resulting interpretation would irrevocably violate the Manner supermaxim (‘Be Per-
spicuous’), since the most straightforward way of conveying this implicated information would 
have been to express it directly.” 
21 As Grice (1989:32) says about Manner in the petrol case, “there seems to be no case for 
regarding that supermaxim as infringed in this example.” 
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have seen, the speaker in this case violates Relation at the level of what is said. 
Moreover, she could have been closer to observing Relation at the level of what 
is said (she could even have fully observed that maxim) by saying, for example, 
that nothing can be done about John’s absence. 
One last clarification regarding the notion of being close to observing the max-
ims: Whether a speaker is close to observing the maxims as a whole depends 
not only on the sum of the distances to observing each individual maxim (as it 
were). It depends on a weighted sum of these distances. As Grice puts it, it “is 
obvious that the observance of some of these maxims is a matter of less urgency 
than is the observance of others” (1989:27). In particular, the distance to the qual-
ity maxims will be weighted more strongly than the distance to the other maxims. 
With these definitions at hand, we can easily see why the France case above 
involves an observation rather than an exploitation implicature: The speaker in 
this case provides less information than is required and thus fails to observe the 
quantity maxims at the level of what is said. But this is presumably so only be-
cause, if she were to provide more information by saying, say, that Frankie lives 
in Cannes, she would say something she doesn’t justifiably believe and thus fail 
to observe the quality maxims at the level of what is said. So, even though the 
speaker fails to observe a maxim at the level of what is said, there is nothing she 
could have said to come closer to observing the maxims. The first disjunct of 
(DefO*) is not satisfied, but the second is. 
The above proposal yields the right results for the relevant cases. However, it 
also makes the present framework much more cumbersome and difficult to han-
dle. In particular, we can no longer test whether an implicature is observational 
by simply looking at whether the speaker observes all individual maxims. Instead, 
we now have to check whether she observes all individual maxims and, if she 
doesn’t, whether there is anything she could have said that would have brought 
her closer to observing the maxims. So here is a second, somewhat simpler way 
to deal with the France case. 
We stick to the simple definitions (DefE) and (DefO). However, we slightly mod-
ify the content of Quantity1. So far, this maxim says that one should be as in-
formative as is required. Instead, we say that, according to Quantity1, one should 
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be as informative as is required, but only to the extent that this is compatible with 
the quality maxims. More precisely: 
A speaker S making an utterance u in a conversational context C ob-
serves Quantity1 at the level of what is said just if either what S says 
in uttering U is as informative as is required in C, or, of all the propo-
sitions available to S that S justifiably believes, what S says in uttering 
u is closest to being as informative as is required in C.22 
Given this interpretation of Quantity1, the France case turns out to involve an 
observation implicature even if we stick to (DefE) and (DefO): Of all the things the 
speaker in this case justifiably believes, what she actually says is closest to being 
as informative as is required (keeping to the side all those propositions the 
speaker justifiably believes but which just didn’t come to her mind). Correspond-
ingly, she observes Quantity1 at the level of what is said in the sense just defined. 
As I said, I don’t know which of the above two accounts of the France case is 
ultimately correct. In what follows, I will stick to the second account because, for 
the purposes of the present paper, it is easier to handle. 
I hope to have established by now that the most plausible interpretation of the 
distinction between observation and exploitation implicatures, as it figures in 
Grice and Levinson’s work, entails that there are implicatures involving no maxim 
violation at the level of what is said. In particular, Grice and Levinson seem to 
hold that all observation implicatures are non-violating at the level of what is said. 
Furthermore, I hope to have clarified one prima facie coherent way of spelling out 
the thesis that there are such implicatures.  
                                            
22 The quality maxims could be incorporated into Quantity2 and Relation in an analogous fash-
ion. Grice (1989:27) seems to express sympathies for such a proposal: “it might be felt that the 
importance of at least the first maxim of Quality is such that it should not be included in a scheme 
of the kind I am constructing; other maxims come into operation only on the assumption that this 
maxim of Quality is satisfied.”  
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6. Calculating observation and exploitation implicatures 
In this section, I will address what seems to be the most pressing worry for the 
thesis that there are observation implicatures in the sense just defined: Observa-
tion implicatures, on the present understanding, do not involve the violation of a 
maxim at the level of what is said. Thus, nothing can trigger the search for such 
implicatures. In what follows, I will respond to this worry by proposing the follow-
ing view: While the calculation of exploitation implicatures is triggered when the 
speaker doesn’t hold a belief she needs to hold to observe the maxims at the 
level of what is said, the calculation of observation implicatures is triggered when 
the hearer doesn’t share one of these beliefs (and the belief in question does not 
coincide with what is said). To substantiate this response, I will supplement it with 
at least a rough approximation of the calculation patterns for observation and 
exploitation implicatures. 
Let’s start with observation implicatures and the petrol case. How do we cal-
culate the implicature in this case? The hearer could go through the following 
reasoning: The speaker is observing the maxims at the level of what is said when 
she says, “There is a garage around the corner.” The speaker can be observing 
the maxims, in particular Relation, at the level of what is said only if she holds the 
belief that garages generally sell petrol (because what the speaker says is rele-
vant for the question on the table relative to the mutual beliefs of speaker and 
audience only if this proposition is mutually believed). Nothing speaks against this 
assumption. Thus, the speaker believes that garages generally sell petrol. Cor-
respondingly, she also believes that the mentioned garage is likely to sell petrol 
(“p”). I do not yet believe p. The speaker knows (and knows that I know she 
knows) that I can figure out that she believes p. She has done nothing to stop me 
from believing p. Thus, she intends me to believe, or is at least willing to allow me 
to believe, p. Hence, she has implicated p.23 
                                            
23 The reasoning described closely follows the reasoning Grice (1989:31) himself describes 
as a means to calculate implicatures. Even though Grice suggests that all implicatures can be 
calculated along the lines of this pattern, he uses a very different pattern when he later considers 
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The implicature in the above France case can be calculated in a similar way: 
The speaker observes the maxims at the level of what is said when she responds, 
“Somewhere in the south of France,” to the question of where Frankie lives. She 
can be observing the maxims, in particular (the modified version of) Quantity1, at 
the level of what is said only if she cannot justifiably be more specific and, hence, 
presumably believes that she cannot justifiably be more specific. Nothing speaks 
against this assumption. Thus, the speaker believes that she cannot justifiably be 
more specific (“q”). I do not yet believe q, etc. Thus, the speaker implicates q. For 
another straightforward example of observational calculation, consider the follow-
ing case: Someone says, “Katie got drunk and drove home.” In a standard con-
text, she thereby implicates that the events happened in the order in which they 
are stated (that is, Katie first got drunk and then drove home).24 The calculation 
of this implicature could go as follows: The speaker is observing the maxims at 
the level of what is said. In particular, she is observing Manner. If she is observing 
Manner, she must believe that the events she refers to happened in the order in 
which she refers to them. Nothing speaks against this assumption. Thus, the 
speaker believes that the events she refers to happened in the order in which she 
refers to them (“r”). I do not yet believe r, etc. Thus, the speaker implicates r. 
Before we go on to address the question of what triggers calculations of the 
sort just described, let’s first consider the calculation pattern for exploitation im-
plicatures. How do we calculate the implicature in the case of John’s absence? 
The hearer could reason as follows: The speaker observes the maxims at the 
level of what is said when she says, “John will come or he won’t.” The speaker 
can be observing the maxims, in particular Relation, at the level of what is said 
only if she holds beliefs such that adding the logical truth that John will or will not 
come makes a particular answer to the question of what to do about John’s ab-
sence more likely. Clearly, the speaker doesn’t hold such beliefs. Thus, contrary 
                                            
examples of implicatures where a maxim is flouted (see esp. Grice’s discussion of irony on p. 34). 
The pattern Grice uses there is closely related to the pattern I will present below for the calculation 
of exploitation implicatures. See Hugly and Sayward (1979) for a similar observation. 
24 See Levinson (1983:108) for a related example. 
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to the initial assumption, the speaker doesn’t observe the maxims at the level of 
what is said. Still, she observes the maxims at the level of what is conveyed (she 
neither refuses to be cooperative nor is inadvertently uncooperative (e.g. due to 
some kind of misunderstanding) nor is trying to deceive). Correspondingly, what 
the speaker means to convey must differ from what is said. All things considered, 
the most plausible candidate conveyed content is that nothing can be done about 
John’s absence. So the speaker implicates that nothing can be done about John’s 
absence. 
The implicature in the above letter of recommendation case can be calculated 
along similar lines: The writer observes the maxims at the level of what is said 
when she writes, “The student has a nice handwriting.” She cannot observe the 
maxims, in particular Quantity1, at the level of what is said unless she cannot 
justifiably provide further relevant information and, thus, presumably believes that 
she cannot justifiably provide further relevant information. Clearly, the writer 
doesn’t hold that belief (for, clearly, a student’s advisor should be able to provide 
further relevant information). Thus, contrary to the initial assumption, the writer 
doesn’t observe the maxims at the level of what is said. Still, she observes them 
at the level of what is conveyed. Thus, she must mean to convey something other 
than what is said. And, all things considered, the most natural candidate here is 
that the student has a nice handwriting and there is nothing more commendable 
to be said about her.25 
Admittedly, both the calculation pattern for observation implicatures and the 
calculation pattern for exploitation implicatures stand in need of further clarifica-
tion. In the case of exploitation implicatures, the “all things considered” reasoning 
at the end of the pattern remains obscure. In the case of observation implicatures, 
the steps from the realization that the speaker holds beliefs the hearer does not 
share to the conclusion that the content of these beliefs is implicated could be 
                                            
25 Note that, as indicated already, in this case we have an exploitation implicature that is addi-
tive: The reader realizes that the writer doesn’t observe the maxims at the level of what is said. 
As the example shows, however, this does not force her to altogether discard what is said; what 
is said may still be one conjunct of what is overall conveyed. 
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clearer. Independently of how these steps are spelled out, however, the worry 
that nothing can trigger the search for observation implicatures can now be dis-
pelled. 
To begin with, we can ask where the first premise in the above calculation 
patterns comes from, according to which the speaker observes the maxims at the 
level of what is said. I take this to be a (defeasible) default assumption that every 
hearer initially holds with respect to every utterance she faces. Given this default 
assumption, what triggers the inference to an implicature? In order to maintain 
the default assumption, the hearer has to ascribe all sorts of beliefs to the 
speaker; for example, a belief in what is said, background beliefs required for the 
relevance of what is said, some obvious consequences of these beliefs, etc. If 
the speaker can plausibly hold all of these beliefs and, apart from the belief in 
what is said, the hearer shares these beliefs, the hearer just takes what is said 
as what is conveyed and no inference to an implicature is triggered. An inference 
to an implicature is triggered only if either of the following happens: The hearer 
realizes that the speaker cannot plausibly hold the required beliefs, or the hearer 
realizes that, even though the speaker plausibly does hold the required beliefs, 
the hearer does not (yet) share them (again, leaving to the side the belief in what 
is said). In the first kind of case, the hearer calculates an exploitation implicature 
if she can plausibly follow the steps subsequent to the realization that the speaker 
is not observing the maxims at the level of what is said in the calculation pattern 
described above for exploitation implicatures (i.e. if the speaker can be assumed 
to be observing the maxims at the level of what is conveyed, etc.). In the second 
kind of case, the hearer calculates an observation implicature if she can plausibly 
follow the steps subsequent to the realization that the speaker holds a belief the 
hearer does not share in the calculation pattern described above for observation 
implicatures (i.e. if the speaker can be assumed to know that the hearer can figure 
out the relevant belief, etc.). 
Most importantly, the inference trigger in the case of observation implicatures 
by no means entails that the speaker is not observing the maxims at the level of 
what is said. To the contrary, in the case of observation implicatures, the speaker 
holds all the beliefs she needs to hold to observe the maxims at the level of what 
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is said. Hence, she does observe the maxims at the level of what is said. The 
inference trigger, in such cases, is that the hearer does not already hold the be-
liefs in question. And this is not a condition on observing the maxims at the level 
of what is said for the speaker. (Of course, in cases of exploitation implicatures, 
the speaker does violate the maxims at the level of what is said, for in these cases 
she doesn’t hold the required beliefs.)26 
7. Conclusion 
I have shown that Grice and Levinson, two eminent figures in the debate on im-
plicatures, assume that there are observation implicatures, that is, implicatures 
that arise even though no maxim is violated at the level of what is said. In doing 
so, I have outlined one seemingly coherent way of spelling out the thesis that 
there are such implicatures. Moreover, I have defended the idea of observation 
implicatures against the pressing worry that observation implicatures cannot be 
calculated. It should thus be safe to conclude that we cannot just assume that 
such implicatures don’t exist. We should rethink this common assumption. 
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26 Note that, given that in the case of observation implicatures no maxim is violated at the level 
of what is said, the hearer has no reason to doubt that what is said is supposed to be conveyed. 
So, at least in successful communications, all observation implicatures are additive. (We have 
seen above that the converse does not hold, that is, some exploitation implicatures are additive 
as well.) 
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